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20
January 
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BAKU 1991: ONE YEAR AFTER BLACK JANUARY by Audrey L. Altstadt AACAR BULLETIN of the Association for the Advancement of Central Asian Research,Inc. Editor: H. B. PAKSOY Vol. IV No. 1, Spring 1991 The use of Soviet armed forces in Baku last January solved none of the long-standing problems which plagued that republic -- economic disadvantage, ecological damage, political struggle, the threat to the NKAO or fighting along the border. Nor did it root out support for the democratic movement. Intervention allowed the communist party apparatus in Azerbaijan (AzCP) to reassert itself, but it was the power "from the barrel of a gun" not of public support. "They can kill us, but cannot make us bend..." wrote one newspaper.1 Before the arrival of the Soviet Armed forces last January, the (AzCP) was in the throes of a crisis. The AzCP (like CPs in many other republics) had always had to perform a "balancing act" between the demands of Moscow and those of the population of the republic. CP power depended on Moscow, but a party organization that lost all popular support and confidence would be useless as an instrument of central policies. As long as there was no organized "voice" to express popular will, the AzCP had little difficulty in dealing with isolated opposition and could retain its "balance." The growth of informal groups, the most influential of which was the Azerbaijan Popular Front (APF), changed that. The growth of the APF coincided with the tenure of Moscow appointee A. Vezirov as First Secretary. Under Vezirov, the AzCP had leaned too far to Moscow's side, ignoring both the popular will on vital issues of the day and refusing to recognize the "informal" groups who articulated it. By the end of 1989, the party had apparently lost authority in the popular mind and had lost control of several towns --Jalilabad, Lenkoran-- and several points of the republican borders. Indeed, this loss of control appears to have been the main reason for Moscow's use of troops in Baku. Within the party, too, a split was evident. A stunning speech by party Secretary Hasan Hasanov was published in APF organs in early January 1990.2 Hasanov revealed that many decisions concerning the NKAO carried out by Moscow ostensibly after consultation with the AzCP had actually come as a surprise to Baku. Thus it appeared that while the party had been toeing Moscow's line, Moscow was ignoring the AzCP. The AzCP was not only not defending Azerbaijan's interests, its sovereignty and its territory, it was not even able to represent them in any meaningful way. With the military presence and the imposition of martial law, the AzCP struggled to regain its authority. As is usual in such crises, the First Secretary was immediately sacked and blamed for everything. His successor was a local engineer, Ayaz Niyazioglu Mutalibov. During February and March, the party waged a campaign to restore confidence in itself both internally and among the public. Apparently, the party realized it had to embrace popular demands to reestablish credibility and enforce its claim to leadership. The new AzCP platform, produced in May, was essentially the old APF platform couched at times in standard party rhetoric.3 The platform and Mutalibov's first speech as republican President4 called for economic and political solidarity, guarantees of territorial integrity, and security of borders. Among other points adopted from the opposition was the call for more equitable prices of commodities produced by Azerbaijan and reforming education to foster "greater national consciousness." The NKAO and Nakhjivan ASSR were affirmed as inalienable parts of Azerbaijan. In keeping with their autonomous positions, their rights to determine their own "economic and social development and cultural construction" was assured. But the party pledged "to carry out a decisive and uncompromising battle against any attempts at creation of unconstitutional organs of power..." in those regions. This was still the communist party program, and it affirmed its commitment to a "Leninist conception of socialism" and the development of a materialist world view. It claimed political leadership for the AzCP as guarantor of perestroika. Mutalibov welcomed "political pluralism" and pledged the AzCP to contend in elections with other parties using democratic methods, he warned that "unruliness" would not be permitted. We are all tired of extremism, he said. We can not separate democracy from law and order. The rhetoric and positions of the AzCP did not substantially change after May. It reflected that the party had been forced to abandon its traditional posture and adopt the demands of its opponents. It was a defeat for AzCP. The APF and other opposition groups meanwhile continued under the State of Emergency to protest Moscow's actions of January 1990: the use of troops; the failure of the Soviet government first to declare a state of emergency or establish a curfew which could have reduced civilian casualties; the use of live ammunition and heavy artillery against civilians; and for the resulting deaths of 200 or more civilians (ranging in age from under 12 to over 70 years of age) and the injury of hundreds, perhaps thousands. A report of July by "Shield," a group of military experts from the USSR military procurator's office in Moscow supported APF statements.5 "Shield" agreed that either Soviet "special forces" or the KGB had blown up the television-radio power station a few hours before the entry of troops, and that the populace was notified of a curfew only on the morning of 20 January after troops had control of Baku. The "Shield" report rejected the military's claims of "returning fire," noting there was no evidence that those manning barricades on roads leading into Baku had been armed. The report listed vehicle numbers of three ambulances crushed by tanks. "Shield" listed 120 civilian dead and more than 700 wounded, in contrast to the local military authorities' claim of 83 dead, including 14 military personnel. "Shield" concluded that the army had been used against the local population, not an external threat. The Baku press and the many meetings at the University and Academy of Sciences led, by the time of the September elections, to a new APF platform, the basis for a broad election bloc called "Democratic Azerbaijan." If the AzCP platform had usurped many of APF's original planks, the new APF platform reflected a significant evolution on fundamental issues. Furthermore, in the new platform, the Popular Front no longer defined itself with respect to the communist party or the old order, reflecting both political maturity and its decisive opposition to the regime in Moscow and the entire Soviet system. The first item of the program stated that the Red Army had occupied the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic on 28 April 1920 and that the creation of the Azerbaijan soviet government had been an illegal act. The platform further stated that relations between Azerbaijan and the Union must be changed in accord with Azerbaijan's constitution; provisions contrary to the interests of economic, political and cultural interests of the Azerbaijani people are to be eliminated; reciprocal agreements will be rejected if they restrict the people's "right to choose its own path;" the republic will maintain separate foreign policy and diplomacy. Regarding Domestic Policy the platform states the willingness to fight for sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of all citizens; the need for self-defense and internal security is affirmed; the platform argues the need for the development of a concept of independence [dovlet mustegilik] and creation of an independent state; the state, legal system and information structures should be "de-party-cized" and the civil society should be "de-ideologized;" freedom of speech, conscience and religion should be guaranteed; passport regime should be dismantled; the right to cultural development of all citizens regardless of their nationality should be protected; to protect the security of territory, NKAO should be dissolved. Development of a free market is called for and creation of conditions favoring foreign investment, foreign trade, tourism. The platform suggests reconsideration of the existing social welfare system and states the work of mothers raising children is equal to other social labor. Human rights are to be guaranteed and "democratic government (majority government)" is to be fought for; in litigation, the accused are to be presumed innocent; acts not prohibited by law are to be regarded as legal. Under the section on "culture and education," the exiting apparatus is to be destroyed and replaced; national-cultural wealth illegally taken from the republic is to be returned, the alphabet is to be "reformed" and religious buildings seized or damaged by state or party are to be restored. Finally, on ecological issues, the current Council of Ministers committee for environmental protection is to be dissolved and a comparable commission is to be created under the parliament [sic]; environmental protection measures are to be strengthened.6 It was perhaps clear that the proponents of this program stood for nothing less than the complete destruction of the Soviet system in Azerbaijan, and could therefore not be permitted to win any substantial representation. In the elections of 30 September amid widespread charges of impropriety, falsification, intimidation (two APF candidates were murdered days before the election) and outright fraud, the AzCP candidates won most seats and the APF about 26 of 350 seats. In several districts, run-offs were held two weeks later, on 14 October, but APF candidates did apparently not do much better. Aside from denouncing the illegal practices of the AzCP, there was little the APF could do. It continues to discuss the broad spectrum of issues that concerns the republic. The major issue (apart from ending the State of Emergency) that now confronts the political forces in Azerbaijan is the union treaty. Any treaty which is written by the center not the republics, proclaimed one commentary,7 will remain unsatisfactory. Power for protecting territorial integrity was given to the center in 1922 and how has Moscow fulfilled it --by giving bits of Azerbaijan to its neighbors over the last 70 years. (97,000 sq km in 1922, but 86,600 sq km today). Economic criticism8 has included the same statement that power must be given by the republics to the center (not the reserve), that the proposed union agreement relies too heavily on organs of coercion for implementation, and that it will not develop infrastructure in the republics "freezing" them at current relative levels (detrimental to Azerbaijan). The latest word from Baku is that if some guarantees of "territorial integrity" are included, Mutalibov is prepared to accepted the treaty as now written. The APF will not. Azerbaijan commemorates "Black January," there are few signs of hope in the Union. They see a replay of Baku's horrors in Lithuania and Latvia and hear plans for soldiers to patrol cities with the police. When Moscow is "liberal," Azerbaijan may still be crushed. When Moscow begins to talk about control, Azerbaijan begins to talk about 1937. Notes: 1. Azerbaijan (organ of the Karabagha Khalg Yardimi Komitesi), 24 February 1990. 2. Reported in the APF organ Azadlik 14 January 1990. 3. Bakinskii Rabochii (BR) 22 May 1990, pp. 1-2. 4. Edebiyyat ve Injesenet 25 May 1990, pp. 1-2. Mutalibov in speech noted that party program had been accepted by CC that morning. 5. The commission "Shchit" ("Shield") examined evidence during 12-22 July 1990; its report was printed in Moskovskie novosti 12 August and reprinted in BR 17 August, p.3 with the title "Ianvar' v Baku." References are from BR. 6. Azadlik 8 September 1990 7. Azerbaijan, 4 May 1990 by Tofik Gandilov (Moscow). 8. Azadlik 22 November 1990, "Ittifag programy bize ne vad edir?" by Saleh Mammadov, doctor of economics.
THE AZERBAIJAN KHALG JEBHESI (AZERBAIJAN PEOPLE'S FRONT) by Audrey L. Altstadt Reprint from: AACAR BULLETIN of the Association for the Advancement of Central Asian Research, Inc. Editor: H. B. PAKSOY Vol. III No. 1 Spring 1990 [Prof. A. L. Altstadt is now Associate Professor at the History Department, University of Massachusetts-Amherst. When this piece was published, she was Assistant Professor of History at Central Connecticut State University. She has spent two terms in Baku on IREX Exchanges. She was a Fellow of the Harvard Russian Research Center, and a Short Term Scholar at the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies. Prof. Altstadt is currently finishing a monograph on the history of Azerbaijan.] The Azerbaijan Khalg Jebhesi (Azerbaijan People's Front, APF) was legalized only last summer. The APF, related groups and unaffiliated supporters of national reform in Azerbaijan have published grievances and needs in both Russian and Azerbaijani Turkish language publications. The demands are specific, and touch upon economic, political, ecological and cultural matters. They present a challenge to Russian hegemony and, for their fulfillment, would require a fundamental alteration in relations between Azerbaijan and Moscow and between Russians and Azerbaijani Turks within the republic itself. The APF evolved at least since 1988 on the basis of issues discussed by the scholarly and artistic elite in Azerbaijani Turkish-language publications throughout the 1980s. The APF therefore represents the culmination of a movement long in gestation. The APF program and BULLETIN place heavy emphasis on economic and political issues, calling for full exercise of sovereignty guaranteed in the constitution and control over natural resources and economic decision making. The program supports the guarantee of civil rights, equal treatment for all nationalities residing in the republic, and protection of the environment and cultural heritage (including expanded de facto use of Azerbaijani Turkish and reinstatement of original geographical and personal names). The program "condemns the use of force in political struggle..." and states that the "founding values of the APF are humanism, democracy, pluralism, internationalism, and human rights."1 In short, despite Gorbachev's attempt to justify sending more than 20,000 troops to Baku by crying "Islamic fundamentalism," the evidence reflects no such influence. Economic grievances have, perhaps, been most widely discussed. Prof. Dr. Mahmud Ismailov, economic historian of the Azerbaijan Academy of Sciences, laid out the specifics of some inequities which had formerly been only whispered.2 "According to the calculations of the economists, our republic has a yearly trade deficit of 2.5 billion rubles. If one considers the fact that the republic is a supplier of such raw materials as cotton, oil, grapes, etc, then it is losing eight to ten billion rubles annually." Raw cotton, he stated is sold by Azerbaijan at 500-700 rubles/ton while cotton goods earn 12-13 thousand rubles per ton. "Azerbaijan annually exports 135 million rubles' worth of wool to Georgia and Armenia, while finished products would bring ten to fifteen times more to the national income." These accusations are seconded by Bahtiyar Vahabzade (People's Deputy; also Narodnyi ["People's"] Poet and corresponding members of the Azerbaijan Academy of Sciences) and Ismail Shykhly (prominent novelist, member of editorial board of the journal AZERBAIJAN).3 Both take up the matter of oil prices. Vahabzade quotes the price at 35 rubles per ton, compared, he says, to $140 per ton on the world market: "...we sell gold like ore, for peanuts, and then buy manufactures made from this raw material, for triple the price." Shykhly states that Azerbaijan sells oil (per ton) for only 3 rubles more than it costs to produce it: "It means we earn 3 rubles per ton. Does it make sense to sell a ton of oil for 3 rubles?!" Thus the real culprit is central planning, i.e. the Russian- dominated system, that establishes prices and mandates the flow of goods. It fails to build necessary enterprises in Azerbaijan so the republic can make finished goods from its own raw materials and employ its own people. Add to this the health and environmental crises created by excessive use of pesticides, and it is no wonder that these men are so bold as to call this colonialism. Even the NKAO matter, like all the others on the APF agenda, really concerns the Soviet system. It was that system that drew the current borders (Azerbaijan, too, feels cheated by them) and adjusted them periodically since 1921. This issue is often used as an example of Moscow's infringing on Azerbaijan's sovereignty. Such considerations furthermore reflect the need to bring the Russians into the formula when examining Azerbaijani-Armenian relations. APF leaders and others4 have argued that Russian instigation may have led to recent clashes in the capital which, in any event, the government used as a pretext to send troops into Baku, even though fighting there had ended. The real goal, they suggest, had been to crush the movement. There are numerous documented cases of such provocation during the clashes of 1905,5 and one Azerbaijani said "there is no absence of such provocateurs now."6 Azerbaijan's national movement is political, economic, cultural,7 environmentalist, and national -- but it is not religious. The rhetoric is reformist, even socialist, but not Islamic. The leaders of the APF have denied religious foundation for their movement and all the published material and speeches confirm that. Recent demonstrations along the Iranian and Turkish borders, despite Tehran Radio's imputation of religious motivation, were aimed at securing free movement to visit relatives in Iranian Azerbaijan. Perhaps the case of Germany urged them to take action at this time. In the aftermath of the shooting in Baku, Soviet Defense Minister Yazov and subsequently Gorbachev himself, acknowledged that troops had been sent to Baku to prevent a seizure of power by the national movement. So why had Gorbachev claimed "Islamic fundamentalism" was the danger at the time he sent the troops? Is it possible that Gorbachev was misinformed? Was his staff was not familiar with the many publications and statements of APF leaders and the scholarly and artistic intelligentsia in Azerbaijan who gave birth to the movement and to the APF? Did they only begin reading when the soldiers began firing? Perhaps the impact of small groups who did use religious rhetoric had been exaggerated. Maybe Gorbachev decided to believe Radio Tehran. Or, as Azerbaijani Turks had said and as Gorbachev's words suggest, was the real target the Azerbaijan Popular Front? Apparently, Gorbachev was well aware of the popularity and program of the APF and, therefore, of the threat it presented to Soviet control over so politically and economically important an area as Azerbaijan. Soviet troops closed APF offices and telephone lines, and arrested more than 40 APF leaders, including historian Ehtibar Mamedov, when he was in Moscow, more than 1000 miles from occupied Baku. Ironically, Gorbachev may have repeated Nicholas II's error when the tsar closed the First State Duma in 1906 -- he succeeded only in removing the moderates from the political scene, and polarizing those who remained. The President of the Supreme Soviet told the Russians that "Azerbaijan would never forgive the murder of its sons and daughters." 8 Rhetoric about an "Islamic" threat has not been abandoned, and national leaders are still called "extremists" or "fanatics." For the sake of his "image" in the West, it is to Gorbachev's advantage to portray the Azerbaijan national movement as fanaticism. What better way to preempt Western criticism of a bloodbath than by raising the specter of the West's preeminent bete noire -- "Islamic fundamentalism." The program of the Azerbaijan People's Front is too little known for even the scholarly community to realize that it has nothing in common with "Islamic fundamentalism." There is no "Azerbaijani lobby" in any Western country to clarify or argue. Within the context of the Gorbachev era, the bloody treatment meted out to Azerbaijan fits the pattern that has emerged in Central Asia. Kazakh sensibilities were trod upon and their protests harshly put down. Is the total number of Kazakh casualties even known? The Crimean Tatars got the same run around from Gorbachev they got from his predecessors. Promises of "consideration" of their case were followed by inaction. And, so many Uzbeks have been tried for "corruption," that all but the intentionally blind have begun to suspect that it is a ploy. Tajikistan is even now experiencing similar bloody upheavals and, again, though grievances were clearly articulated, "Islam" makes its way into the reports. Gorbachev, the politician, deals gently with those whom the West watches, those with large emigre communities in Europe and North America. He raises the Crusader spirit against Islam, even when the "Muslims" are secular, nation-minded men and women who demand only that perestroika be applied to them as well. NOTES 1. Full English-language text was published in CENTRAL ASIA AND CAUCASUS CHRONICLE, Vol 8, No. 4 (August 1989). The first APF BULLETIN [BIULLETEN' INITSIATIVNOGO TSENTRA NARODNOGO FRONTA AZERBAIDZHANA, No. 1, 1989. In Russian, 10 pages.] was apparently issued summer 1989 by the APF Initiatory Center, but contained declarations by the Center dated November and May 1988. It restates the appeal to all citizens of the Azerbaijan SSR "regardless of party status, nationality or religion" to join with the People's Front to fulfill the promises of perestroika in the republic. 2. Published in English translation in CENTRAL ASIA AND CAUCASUS CHRONICLE, Vol. 8, No. 3, July 1989; and in Russian in a newly published newspaper called AZERBAIJAN, 5 November 1989, with the title "V roli pasynkov." The newspaper began publication in October 1989 and took the name AZERBAIJAN in memory of the 1918- 20 newspaper by the same name. The earlier newspaper was published during the period of independence. 3. Both articles in the newspaper AZERBAIJAN, 1 October 1989. 4. Telephone interviews, 21 January 1990 5. Local press of that period as discussed in Altstadt, "Baku 1813-1913" in Michael F. Hamm, Editor THE CITY IN LATE IMPERIAL RUSSIA (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985); Tadeusz Swietochowski, RUSSIAN AZERBAIJAN 1905-1920 (Cambridge U Press, 1985) 6. Telephone interview, 20 January 1990. 7. The cultural arena has been the area of greatest activity for the longest time. Recent expressions of the desire to write accurate history, change the names of places and institutions and use the traditional rather than russified forms of surnames appeared in AZERBAIJAN: "Yeni gazetimiz, yeni arzularimiz," (Our New newspaper, our new desires") by Ilyas Efendiev, 2 October 1989, and "Familiyamizi neje yazag?" ("How Should We Write our Surnames?") unsigned, in 6 November 1989. 8. Eyewitnesses in Baku tell of unarmed on-lookers being shot in the streets or on their own balconies, and passing cars, with their occupants, being crushed by tanks. The Baku newspaper SEHER (3 February 1990) devoted an entire issue to a list of known victims -- 120 listed as dead (full names, birth dates and nationality -- almost all were Azerbaijani Turks, mostly in their 20s and 30s), and hundreds listed as wounded (also with names and ages). Official reports of the death toll are clearly too low. Sources in the republic report hundreds of corpses, some say thousands.
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Over
the night from 19 to 20-th January, 1990 without preliminary declaration
of the state of emergency military units of former Soviet Union
were entered into Baku city and some regions of Azerbaijan. The
invasion into Baku of a large contingent of Soviet Army units, interior
troops and special destination detachments was accompanied by particular
cruelty and unprecedented atrocities. Reprisals were inflicted toward
peace population, hundreds of people were killed, wounded, missing.
